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Abstract— Broadband has been identified as a driver for 
economic growth, and the rollout of these networks is as such of 
key importance for Europe. Still, the observed rollout speed of 
NGAN networks is slower in Europe compared to the United 
States and Asia. The European Commission has identified this 
need and focuses on broadband coverage and high internet use 
penetration in its Digital Agenda for Europe. On national level, 
government and regulators have a twofold objective, translating 
this EU policy and stimulating competition in the retail market. 
Performance indices exist to visualize and quantify the 
performance of national and regional markets. These indices are 
typically used to show the historic performance of broadband 
markets. However, future oriented indices should be used to 
assess the impact of regulatory decisions on social welfare and on 
other market parties. We introduce such an index and show how 
it results in other regulatory outcomes compared with existing 
indices, in the case of wholesale access pricing. 
Keywords-component; NGAN; performance indices; wholesale 
access pricing 
I. EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL BROADBAND POLICY 
Broadband has been identified as a driver for economic 
growth, and the rollout of these networks is as such of key 
importance for Europe. The European Commission drafted the 
Digital Agenda for Europe, introducing several targets for the 
period 2013 - 2020 concerning broadband [1]. For example, 
full broadband coverage with minimum speeds of 30Mbps and 
50% of subscribers having speeds of 100Mbps are two main 
targets for 2020. For 2015, the Digital Agenda targets look to 
stimulate internet use, by setting targets for the use of eServices 
like eCommerce or eGovernment. For 2013, focus is on full 
broadband coverage. Here, broadband is defined as speeds 
equal or higher than  144 Kbps. 
While the Digital Agenda focuses on broadband use and 
coverage, this is only one aspect of the objectives of national 
regulatory authorities (NRA). Improving competition and 
competitive broadband prices are two other goals they strive 
for. The former monopolistic incumbents were forced to open 
up their network for new entrants, the so-called other licensed 
operators (OLOs). Access to the copper network is based on 
regulated access prices, both for local loop unbundling (LLU) 
and bitstream access (BA). The debate about these regulated 
prices is still ongoing. From a competition perspective, LLU 
and BA prices as low as possible decrease the entry barrier for 
new entrants. Additionally, lower LLU prices also have an 
effect on the retail prices. A reduced LLU or BA price could be 
reflected in the final retail offer of OLOs to the end consumer. 
By adopting a lower price strategy, these OLOs can attract 
extra customers, which may decrease the significant market 
power of the incumbent. 
Next to their impact on competition and retail price level, it 
has been argued that LLU prices also affect the investment 
behaviour of the incumbent in next generation access networks 
(NGAN). In [2], a decreasing copper wholesale access price is 
favoured, as this would stimulate broadband investment. By 
decreasing the profit of the incumbent in the copper market, 
lower LLU prices force the incumbent to find more attractive 
markets. Since the NGAN market promises higher average 
revenues per user (ARPU), an investment in this market should 
turn out to be more rewarding for the incumbent. 
Although this effect might certainly be observed, there 
could be secondary effects which also influence the investment 
behaviour of the incumbent. Investment in NGAN requires a 
higher ARPU compared to existing services for the incumbent 
to be an economically interesting decision. But when the LLU 
price decrease is reflected in the retail prices offered by OLOs, 
this could result in a significant price difference between the 
copper and NGAN offer [3]. Rational users could prefer the 
‘same product for less money’ copper offer over the ‘better 
offer for the same money’ offer of NGAN. While there will 
obviously be users preferring the NGAN offer, there might be a 
negative impact of the lower copper retail price on the viability 
of the NGAN business case. Recently, empirical research 
indicated the negative effects of copper unbundling on 
broadband deployment [4]. 
Additionally, there is extra uncertainty surrounding the 
investment climate for the incumbent. It is unclear what the 
future regulation will be concerning the NGAN networks. Will 
they be required to open up the NGAN network to new 
entrants, or will there be a regulatory holiday? What will be the 
future decisions on the LLU and BA prices? This uncertainty 
results in the postponement of the investment in NGAN, with 
operators exercising their option to wait.  
Taking all these (sometimes opposite) effects into account, 
it is thus important for NRAs and European policy makers to 
have adequate instruments to measure the effect of their 
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decisions. Performance indices (PI) are one of the tools to 
measure these effects. However, these are typically used ex 
post to assess the impact of previous policy. In this work, it 
will be shown how PIs can be used to compare alternative 
regulatory policies. After a short description of two existing 
PIs, each with their own shortcomings, we will introduce a new 
broadband performance index (BPI). This new BPI is capable 
of making a quantitative trade-off between different regulatory 
objectives. The performance of this new BPI will be assessed 
in a case of wholesale access pricing regulation, showing how 
different PIs result in different outcomes.  
II. THE TELECOM MARKET AND EVOLUTION 
The current evolution in fixed access networks is one of 
continuous increase of demand of bandwidth by users. IPTV, 
video services and other bandwidth hungry applications push 
the need for higher speeds in the access network. The 
introduction of 3DTV channels will raise the need for higher 
access speed even further. 
Currently, incumbent operators possess a nationwide 
copper access network, which has in most cases already been 
upgraded towards Fibre to the Central Office, allowing to offer 
ADSL services, with download speeds between 8 Mbps and 24 
Mbps. Most incumbents are now upgrading this network to 
Fibre to the Cabinet (FttC) networks, which can offer even 
higher access speeds through VDSL. In some countries, cable 
operators are also present, who offer broadband services over a 
Hybrid Fibre Coax (HFC) network, using DOCSIS 2.0 and 
offering speeds up to 30Mbps. 
However, these networks are reaching their limits and 
require upgrading towards higher up- and download speeds. 
Cable networks can be upgraded towards the DOCSIS 3.0 
standard, which can reach download speeds up to 100Mbps. 
The current FttC incumbent networks also still offer room for 
improvement without cost intensive physical infrastructure 
upgrades. New techniques, like shadowing and vectoring can 
stretch the download speeds towards 50 Mbps. Although both 
copper and cable networks have currently not reached their 
limits, continuous bandwidth demand growth will in the long 
run result in the need for more fibre rich networks, like Fibre to 
the Building (FttB) or even Fibre to the Home (FttH). In 
contrast with the existing networks, these can offer 
symmetrical access speeds starting at 60Mbps, with upgrade 
possibilities up to 1Gbps. 
A. The role and objectives of telecom regulation 
National regulatory authorities have to take a plethora of 
objectives and effects into account when taking regulatory 
decisions. One of the major issues in the last decade has been 
the unbundling of the access network. Originally, these 
networks were installed for providing voice signal 
transmission, but technologic evolution also allowed data 
transmission over these networks. As technology continued to 
evolve, data transmission became even more important. 
However, these networks continued to be (partly) publicly 
owned, keeping off all competition in the field, except for 
infrastructure based competition via a cable network. 
With privatization of the sector also came decoupling of the 
incumbent network operators from direct government control. 
Still, since these operators possessed the existing network 
infrastructure, which was installed and paid for during the 
public period, they continued to have a large competitive 
advantage over new entrants. To clear this historic advantage, a 
level playing field needed to be installed, requiring incumbents 
to open up their network to other operators at regulated prices. 
This price is based on an estimation of the maintenance costs 
of this network for the incumbent. In extension, the operator 
might also be forced to open up at the data link layer which is 
often called bitstream access [5]. In theory, the network can be 
opened up at each level of functionality of the OSI layered 
model. For a copper access network, this is typically done on 
the lowest three layers. In case of full unbundling, the 
incumbent patches the copper pair of the customer directly to 
OLO equipment. The OLO has full access to the physical 
medium at OSI layer 0. In case of shared line, the voice signal 
is separated from data by leading the copper pair to a splitter. 
Each signal can then be brought to the incumbent or OLO. This 
way, the physical OSI layer 1is defined for both voice and data. 
In case of BA, voice is split from data in the central office. The 
data is sent into the metro network to aggregation switches, or 
Points of Presence (PoP) where the OLO can collocate his 
equipment. The connection from these PoPs is handles through 
OSI layer 2 or 3. In figure 1, an overview of the different 
possibilities can be found. 
 
Figure 1  Network overview with unbundling locations [5] 
 
The regulated prices for these access types are one of the 
main tools NRAs have at their disposal to influence the retail 
market for broadband access. Decreasing these prices is 
believed to decrease the entry barrier for OLOs, which should 
increase the competition on the retail market. Resulting from 
this increased competition, a price pressure on retail offers 
could be observed [2]. A secondary effect is the push towards 
more profitable investments for the incumbent. As their profit 
margins on the existing copper broadband market decrease, 
they will look towards NGAN investments. 
B. Regulation and network evolution – a difficult interaction 
Although such effects will most certainly play, other 
authors have argued that a decrease of wholesale access prices 
could have negative effects on NGAN investment [3], [4]. 
Expected revenues play a major role in the economic viability 
of new investment projects. If these remain too low, the 
investment can be abandoned. With price pressure on copper 
retail prices, and a higher required ARPU for NGAN 
investments to be profitable, the price gap between both offers 
could increase, pushing customers towards the cheaper offer. 
As such, the expected uptake of the NGAN offer and the 
resulting payoff could decrease drastically, resulting in a 
postponement of NGAN investment. 
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Therefore, it is very important to have adequate prediction 
tools to assess the impact of regulatory decisions. In the 
following paragraph, both existing BPIs and a more NGAN 
oriented BPI will be used to indicate the possible impact of 
LLU price changes. 
III. MEASURING BROADBAND PERFORMANCE 
In the Digital Agenda, which was already introduced 
before, Europe indicates the focal points for any digital 
advances. As indicated, it covers a variety of goals, ranging 
from higher access speeds, better broadband coverage and 
more frequent use of eServices. The Digital Agenda offers a 
clear view on the different important aspects for NRAs in their 
national broadband policy, but offers no quantification 
possibilities or descriptions making its use as a comparative 
index impossible.  
Additionally the Digital Agenda is also missing the aspect 
of competition, while this is also of key importance in 
European and national broadband policy. The copper 
incumbents have been forced to open up their network to 
OLOs, and reducing the significant market power (SMP) 
continues to be a key objective. Focussing policy on the Digital 
Agenda goals while neglecting their impact on competition 
should be avoided. It has been shown that monopoly or 
oligopoly typically results in market power for suppliers, 
reducing the optimal output quantity and sell it at higher prices, 
thereby reducing the consumer surplus [6]. 
Translating the Digital Agenda into a ready to use 
performance indicator is not straightforward. Policy makers 
need to measure the national performance on each aspect of the 
Digital Agenda. Some dimensions, like the number of people 
using eGovernment or eCommerce, might be hard to quantify 
objectively. Even when all indicators are measured, it still 
remains unclear how these different aspects add up. Which 
aspect is the most important to attain? Is broadband coverage 
the most important, or is it eServices use? Additionally, the 
Digital Agenda does not allow for a comparison between 
different scenarios (e.g. simulation outcomes, regions or 
countries, etc.).  
As a starting point the predecessor of the Digital Agenda 
was studied. The broadband performance index (BPI) was 
introduced in 2008 to benchmark the overall performance of 
Member States on a range of factors [7]. These factors include 
speeds, rural coverage, affordability, innovation and other 
socio-economic dimensions. More importantly, it also takes 
into account the competition as it includes a competition-
coverage indicator. Its description covers an extended 
calculation method, complete with weight factors of the 
different dimensions, to come to one number reflecting 
broadband performance. Normalisation through re-scaling is 
used, according to equation 1 below. The weight factors were 
discussed between the European Commission and NRAs in 
order to best reflect the importance of each dimension. 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
The BPI offers an easy to use quantitative PI to assess 
broadband performance; still its definitions are outdated and no 
longer applicable to predict the impact of regulatory decisions 
on nowadays broadband market. Using this PI without any 
updates or changes can easily lead to incorrect conclusions and 
faulty policies failing to achieve what was aimed for. In the 
following sections, we will show how to update this PI to 
capture more reliably the current market and new advances in 
access networks 
IV. AN NGAN ORIENTED BPI 
The previous section clearly indicated that a good 
broadband performance index in which current and next 
generation technologies and the market functioning (e.g. 
competition and pricing) are included is currently missing. In 
this paper we will propose a new broadband performance index 
for which we start from the original BPI and make changes 
where necessary. In this section we indicate the different 
updates made to the original BPI. Each dimension of the BPI 
will be elaborated on, and each change will be motivated. 
A. Broadband rural coverage 
The rural coverage of broadband is the first dimension of 
the BPI, with a weight factor of 12.8%. For this parameter, it is 
important to define both broadband and rural coverage. In the 
original BPI, broadband was defined as access speeds over 
2Mbps. It may be clear that the introduction of NGAN will not 
improve this indicator, while this goal is present in the Digital 
Agenda. Additionally, NGAN is expected to be introduced in 
the more dense areas, since these areas offer the best business 
case.  
This definition should be altered towards NGAN coverage. 
We propose to define NGAN in the updated index as a network 
offering access speeds over 30Mbps in the line of the Digital 
Agenda. This means that it includes both the upgrade of 
existing cable and copper networks as the rollout of FttX 
networks. A future BPI should base its definition of broadband 
threshold on objective measurable data. This could for instance 
be calculated using a formula based on the maximum deployed 
access speeds and on attainable speeds with next generation 
technologies. Depending on the considered scenario and 
regulatory focus, the definition of rural coverage can be 
maintained, or could be relaxed to full coverage including 
deployments in urban areas. In case of optical access networks, 
it was already indicated that rollout will initially focus on urban 
areas. Relaxation  means that when NGAN is rolled out in 
urban areas, this also improves the broadband performance of 
the area. 
B. Competition coverage 
Above, we discussed the importance of a PI taking into 
account the different policy goals of NRAs. This dimension 
was included in the BPI, weighted at 16.7%. Competition 
coverage is the combination of two factors, namely the market 
share of new entrants and national coverage. In this definition, 
it is important to define what a new entrant is. OLOs can 
clearly be seen as new entrants, especially since their total 
market share in most markets is very limited. However, the BPI 
also includes cable operators in the new entrants segment. 
While this may hold for most cases, some exceptions should be 
allowed. For example, in Flanders, the cable operator currently 
holds a market share of around 55% of all broadband users, 
while the former monopolist only holds 40% [8]. In this case, 
the cable operator can no longer qualify as a new entrant. 
The BPI should be altered to only include real OLOs with a 
non-significant market share. Additionally, when NRAs should 
decide to open up the cable network to OLOs as well, the 
market share of those operators should also be included in this 
dimension [9]. 
C. Broadband price 
Broadband price is the umbrella covering three different 
dimensions of broadband pricing, to reflect the affordability of 
broadband. The first dimension is the median broadband price, 
corrected for speed (weight = 8.7%). This indicator is retained 
for the NGAN oriented BPI, with a minor change in the 
calculation method: the median is changed for the average 
price, which will allow using this index in more specific 
smaller scale (e.g. city networks) situations and theoretically 
abstracted (e.g. with less offers) studies. The two other 
dimensions of the broadband price are the average price for 
broadband slower than 2 Mbps and for broadband offering 
speeds between 2 and 8 Mbps (weights 3.8% and 3.4% resp.). 
While these were the typical speed baskets when the BPI was 
first launched, technological evolution has resulted in raising 
access speeds, towards 50 Mbps or even higher. Leaving these 
speeds out of the analysis would neglect the positive impact of 
network investments. Therefore, the speed baskets should be 
updated towards more future proof baskets, in which  the ‘low’ 
speed baskets represent all offers under 30 Mbps, while all 
retail offers with NGAN speeds are classified in the ‘high’ 
speed basket. As mentioned before the broadband threshold of 
30 Mbps is based on the Digital Agenda and should be 
continuously updated. 
 
D. Speeds 
Coverage, competition and affordability were all covered in 
the previous parameters of the updated BPI. However, as the 
introduction of NGAN speeds to end consumers will most 
likely result in an increased uptake of advanced services, speed 
is also an important dimension of the BPI, split up in two 
separate parameters. 
The average speed is the first indicator (weight = 9.8%). It 
may be clear that with more NGAN being rolled out and taken 
up, the value of this indicator will rise. We therefore choose to 
retain this dimension in the NGAN oriented BPI. However, the 
second indicator, the percentage of subscribers with access 
speeds over 2 Mbps, is no differentiator towards NGAN 
(weight = 8.3%). For example in Belgium, almost 100% of the 
country is covered with DSL services, so upgrading the 
network towards NGAN would have no impact on this aspect. 
But when translating the Digital Agenda goals, which aim at 
full coverage of 30 Mbps, the change to this parameter is quite 
straightforward. The speed dimension in the NGAN oriented 
BPI should include both average speed and coverage of 30 
Mbps (or again the broadband threshold). 
E. Other dimensions 
The original BPI also includes dimensions like the take-up 
of advanced services and the socio-economic context (weights 
19.6 and 17.4 resp.). Advanced services was interpreted as the 
number of customers using eServices, like eGovernment, 
eCommerce or eBanking. Socio-economic factors include ICT 
spending and PC penetration. We believe it is important to also 
include such parameters to assess the impact of regulatory 
decisions. However, when using performance indices to predict 
the impact of regulatory decisions, the quantification of these 
parameters would come with a large amount of work and a 
high degree of uncertainty. Therefore, these dimensions are left 
out of the analysis further in this paper. For a visual 
comparison of the original BPI and the new NGAN oriented 
BPI, we refer to Figure 2 and 3. 
 Figure 2: From the broadband performance index 
 
Figure 3: To an NGAN oriented BPI 
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V. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY DECISIONS 
To clearly indicate the need for a NGAN oriented 
performance index, the evolution of both indices, the existing 
and updated BPI will be evaluated under two change scenarios. 
As a benchmark scenario, the current situation in Belgium will 
be assessed. The two exemplary future scenarios comprise a 
scenario where the regulator lowers LLU prices and a scenario 
where an important increase in NGAN deployment is assessed. 
In both scenarios, the impact on the broadband performance 
(both original and updated BPI) is calculated and compared. 
A. Current broadband performance in Belgium 
Belgium is characterised by both high broadband coverage 
and take-up. In 2011, the number of households with a 
broadband connection was around 81%. Two large players can 
be identified in this market, the incumbent holding a market 
share of 42% and the cable operator claiming 47% of the 
market. The remainder of the broadband market is in hands of 
OLOs [9].  
Operators are currently upgrading their network towards 
NGAN, and 30% of the customers already have download 
speeds over 30 Mbps. Retail prices for these offers can be 
found in Table 1 below, current access speeds in Table 2. 
Rural coverage of broadband according to the definition 
used in the existing BPI is 100%. We assume 50% coverage of 
NGAN.  
Table 1  Average broadband retail prices in Belgium 
Provider Retail price (excl. VAT) 
OLO €27 
Cable €29 
Incumbent €28.6 
NGAN €37 
 
Table 2  Current broadband speeds and market shares [9] 
Speed basket Market share 
< 2 Mbps 2% 
2 – 10 Mbps 29% 
10 – 30 Mbps 39% 
30 - 100 Mbps 28% 
>= 100 Mbps 2% 
 
Table 3  Market share of the different offers 
NGAN 30% 
Non NGAN incumbent 29.4% 
Non NGAN cable 32.9% 
Non NGAN OLO 7.7% 
 
These inputs allow calculating the value of the existing and 
updated BPI for the current situation. Notice that we leave out 
the socio-economic factors and take-up of advanced services in 
the existing BPI as well. 
Table 4 shows the results for the existing and updated BPI 
for the current situation, which serve as benchmark scenario. 
Table 4  Current broadband performance in Belgium 
Performance index Value 
Existing BPI 0.2430 
Updated BPI 0.5732 
 
B. Impact of scenarios on broadband performance 
Two different scenarios were indicated above. In the first 
scenario, the regulator drops the LLU price significantly with 
the aim to stimulate competition, the second focuses on 
assessing correctly the impact of broadband. 
1) Decrease of LLU  
The impact of the first action in this stylized example is as 
follows. A decrease in the LLU price is directly reflected in the 
retail price of the different offers. Currently, the LLU price in 
Belgium is set at €8.03 per line per month. In addition, it is 
expected to influence the take-up of OLO services. For this 
example, we expect that a decrease of the LLU price with €3 
increases the market share of the OLO with 2 percent point, 
equally reducing the market shares of the incumbent and cable 
operator. As the broadband market is typically considered to be 
very inelastic, a significant drop in total broadband customers 
is not expected for a price cut of €3 (10%) and we neglected 
this effect. The resulting BPIs and the relative change 
compared to the existing situation can be found in Table 5.  
Table 5  Impact of decreasing the LLU price 
Performance index Value Change 
Existing BPI 0.2459 + 1.19% 
Updated BPI 0.5830 + 1.71% 
 
It is clear that the effect of increased competition is 
reflected in both performance indices. This is a combined 
effect of both the lowered prices and the increased market 
share of OLOs. If the LLU price decrease would only have an 
effect on the prices, but not on the market shares, the BPI 
increase would only be 0.08% and 1.33% for the existing and 
updated BPI respectively. Both BPIs clearly assess the impact 
of increased competition and decreasing retail prices correctly. 
It has been argued that decreasing the LLU price would 
have a negative effect on the take-up of NGAN products and 
services, due to the increased price gap between the NGAN 
and non-NGAN offers. In this scenario, the NGAN price 
remains unchanged compared to the current situation, resulting 
in a decreased market share. We assume a decrease of 6%, 
which is equally attributed to the three other players. We leave 
out the effect of increased OLO take-up to filter this impact 
from the BPIs. As can be seen from Table 7, this change has a 
negative effect on both BPIs. If decreasing the LLU price 
would indeed force consumers from more expensive NGAN 
products towards the cheaper existing products, the broadband 
performance of the region will decrease. Of course, this effect 
is most pronounced in the NGAN oriented updated BPI. 
Table 6  Market shares after LLU price decrease 
NGAN 24% 
Non NGAN incumbent 31.4% 
Non NGAN cable 34.9% 
Non NGAN OLO 9.7% 
 
Table 7  BPI changes from decrease in NGAN market 
share 
Performance index Value Change 
Existing BPI 0.2413 - 0.7% 
Updated BPI 0.5159 - 10% 
 
If all the effects described above are combined, i.e. a lower 
retail price for all offers (except NGAN), a decrease in market 
share for NGAN and an increase of the OLO market share, the 
total effect on the BPIs shows a different view (Table 8). The 
effect of increased competition outweighs the decrease in 
NGAN take-up in the existing BPI. For the updated BPI, there 
is clearly a detrimental effect on the broadband performance 
due to decrease in the NGAN take-up. This example clearly 
indicates that the possible side effects of reducing the LLU 
price might go unnoticed for the regulator if he does not take 
the NGAN deployment and uptake into account in his 
measurements.   
Table 8  Combined effect of LLU price decrease on 
broadband performance 
Performance index Value Change 
Existing BPI 0.2546 + 4.77% 
Updated BPI 0.5269 - 8.08% 
 
2) Increase of NGAN 
In this section, the rationale from [3] is implemented in the BPI 
models. The LLU price is maintained, so no retail price effects 
are observed. Additionally we consider an increase in the 
NGAN coverage to 90%. The effect of increased NGAN 
coverage is shown in Table 9. Since this dimension is not 
included in the existing BPI, no effect of increased coverage is 
observed. However, the updated BPI shows a significant 
increase. When taking into account that increased NGAN 
coverage will most likely also influence the take-up of those 
services, the effect is even more pronounced. An increase of 10 
percent point NGAN take-up together with increased coverage 
results in a 36% increase of broadband performance according 
to the updated BPI. This means that any simulation or 
measurement of the broadband performance using the original 
BPI, of an area in which NGAN has only recently been 
deployed, will totally miss the positive effect of this rollout. As 
uptake of NGAN network services follows an S-shaped curve, 
it could take some time before a market switch is happening 
and as such before the positive effects get noticed through an 
increased uptake of NGAN.  
Table 9  BPI changes due to increased NGAN coverage 
Performance index Value Change 
Existing BPI 0.2430 / 
Updated BPI 0.6627 + 15.61% 
 
Table 10  Combined effect  
increased NGAN coverage and take-up 
Performance index Value Change 
Existing BPI 0.2507 + 3.17% 
Updated BPI 0.7794 + 35.97% 
 
Clearly basing regulatory actions on simulations and 
calculations using the original BPI could lead to detrimental 
side effects once implemented. It is essential to measure, both 
in simulation as well as after implementation of regulatory 
actions, the different effects using an index taking into account 
both competition as well as NGAN deployment and uptake. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Measuring broadband performance is a difficult task for 
national regulatory authorities. Coverage, prices, speeds and 
competition are different dimensions of the concept broadband 
performance. Not only are those parameters not always 
straightforward to measure, when NRAs try to increase 
broadband performance, interacting effects between the 
different dimensions have to be taken into account. Focussing 
on increased competition and lower retail prices could decrease 
the take-up of NGAN or vice versa.  
In order to adequately measure the national broadband 
performance, performance indices need to be developed who 
can take these interacting effects into account. In this paper, 
two existing performance indices were described. The Digital 
Agenda is the most future oriented PI, but lacks quantification 
possibilities. The existing BPI allows quantifying broadband 
performance, while taking into account the interaction effects 
between the different dimensions. However, since the existing 
BPI works with outdated definitions of broadband, and leaves 
out any impact of NGAN, a NGAN oriented BPI was 
developed in this paper, starting from the existing BPI. In order 
to assess the performance of both PIs in a regulatory setting, 
they were applied to a hypothetical case study in Belgium. 
The impact of LLU price was taken as an example. Two 
different viewpoints on the effect of such changes have been 
studied. In the first scenario, the rationale that lower LLU 
stimulates competition was taken. Both PIs show that this 
effect translates into a higher broadband performance. 
However, when these lower LLU prices also influence the 
take-up of NGAN, and drive consumers towards the cheaper 
offers, the positive effect of increased competition is offset by 
the decreased NGAN take-up. However, when using the 
existing BPI, this has a positive effect on the broadband 
performance. When correcting this PI to include NGAN, the 
effect is clearly negative. These results show the importance of 
including future oriented measures in performance indices, 
especially if they are used to estimate the impact of regulation. 
The second scenario covered the impact of NGAN rollout 
on broadband performance. Since this dimension is left out in 
the existing BPI, no impact was observed. When using the 
updated BPI, there is however a clear impact of such a rollout 
on broadband performance, which is even more significant if 
this also results in higher NGAN uptake. 
In this paper, it has been shown that performance indices 
can also be used to predict the impact of regulation, if the 
correct PIs are chosen. In future work, the updated BPI 
developed in this work can be used in research assessing the 
impact of regulation on price and investment strategies of the 
broadband operators in a certain geographic region. As such, it 
is possible to study the equilibrium outcome where different 
players try to maximize their payoff, being it profit for 
operators or social welfare for NRAs. 
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